To properly understand what is happening in the western Black Sea, it is essential to place these movements in a broader geopolitical, economic, and security context that goes far beyond a simple analysis of AIS tracks. The ships we are talking about do not appear in a vacuum, and their behavior is not the result of isolated decisions, but part of a systemic adaptation by Russia and commercial networks associated with the sanctions regime imposed after the military invasion of Ukraine.
After February 2022, the Russian Federation was forced to radically reconfigure its exports of oil and petroleum products. Black Sea ports, particularly Novorossiysk, became key points for maintaining energy flows, and Western sanctions stimulated the emergence and expansion of the so-called "shadow fleet": old or relatively old ships, operated through opaque corporate structures, with frequent changes of flag, management, and nominal owners. The aim is not necessarily to completely conceal the activity, but rather dilution of responsibility and fragmentation of traceability, enough to make the application of Western sanctions difficult and slow.
Sea routes to Asia for oil shipments from Novorossiysk, as well as from Primorsk and Ust-Luga. (Source: HIGH NORTH NEWS)
In this context, offshore areas outside territorial waters (or Exclusive economic zone – EEZ), but located near EU and NATO coasts, are becoming strategically important. They offer an ideal balance between visibility and ambiguity: ships are far enough away to avoid direct control, but close enough to allow for rapid operations, synchronization between multiple units, and flexible responses to changes in context—be they meteorological, commercial, or security-related. Romania's exclusive economic zone fits perfectly into this pattern.
Romania's exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea, covering an area of approximately 25,000 km², an area with sovereign rights over natural resources, and the area to be analyzed is marked by the red square – 34-37 kilometers of coastline, across Tuzla. (Source: Global Fishing Watch)
The exclusive economic zone is a legally ambiguous space where the coastal state has limited rights, an ambiguity increasingly exploited by actors operating at the edge of the law. Although the repeated presence of opaque vessels in the EEZ is not illegal in itself, it creates a permissive environment for cumulative security, environmental, and economic risks. In the context of the Black Sea, already marked by hybrid confrontations and military incidents, such offshore routines take on increased strategic significance. This vulnerability is amplified by Romania's major energy stakes, particularly through the Neptun Deep exploitation, where the normalization of the presence of opaque ships in the vicinity of offshore infrastructure generates a latent risk, even in the absence of direct incidents.
In the fall and winter of 2025 and early 2026, the western Black Sea begins to look increasingly like a space used not only for commercial transit, but for planned stationing, synchronization, and, most likely, opaque logistical operations orchestrated by Russia.
On December 3, 2025, an oil tanker named CLEAN RAIDER (formerly Uog Despina V according to Marine Traffic) with unique identification number IMO 9425318, sailing under the Liberian flag, arrives in Romania's EEZ. Between December 3 and 12, 2025, CLEAN RAIDER recorded several episodes of loitering off the coast of Romania, being in suspicious proximity (approximately 1.1 km around December 3) to another tanker – KOLENTE (formerly Pm Bradley) with IMO 9264271 under the Sierra Leone flag and coming from the port of Novorossiysk (Russia). We analyzed the public data provided by the portal Equasis and the CLEAN RAIDER vessel has been owned since July 3, 2025 by the Greek company Viking Liquid Investments Inc. based in Athens. Previously, the ship was owned by Oug Despina V LLC, based in the Marshall Islands (since July 1, 2022). CLEAN RAIDER was built in 2010 and has a tonnage of 29,563 tons, a length of 183 meters, and a width of 32 meters. Over the past 15 years, the tanker has had various names: SLS Land (in 2010), Eships Maya (2010), UACC Ras Tanura (2015), and Uog Despina V (2022).
Photos provided by Marine Traffic showing the oil tanker CLEAN RAIDER (IMO 9425318) docked in the Greek port of Piraeus (October 20, 2025). (Source: Marine Traffic)
Data provided by the Marine Traffic platform shows that the CLEAN RAIDER vessel has been repeatedly present in the western Black Sea with two loitering events in Romania's EEZ (December 3-12, 2025) approximately 35-36 kilometers from the coast, across from Tuzla, meaning it remained stationary and moved slowly in 20-30 hour intervals in an area where ships normally only transit. It is not automatically illegal, but it is suspicious, especially since Such behavior may indicate preparation for ship-to-ship (STS) transfers and even hybrid activities "below the threshold of legality" – espionage, testing the reactions of authorities, etcThe same data confirms such behavior at the regional level. CLEAN RAIDER had very long stays in three areas that, in maritime logistics, frequently function as "buffer zones" between routes and destinations, such as southern Cyprus (approx. Limassol area) on October 22-26, 2025, the coast of Georgia (approx. Batumi/Poti area) on November 7-14, and the Malta area with a stay of over 78 hours – another classic hub where legitimate trade flows frequently intersect with semi-legal ones. Translated with DeepL.com (free version)
The oil tanker KOLENTE (IMO 9264271) as seen in photos provided by Marine Traffic between 2020 and 2023. (Source: Marine Traffic)
Viewed separately, KOLENTE has less data recorded on Marine Traffic, which probably indicates a deliberate shutdown of the monitoring system (AIS transponder), a typical behavior oil tankers from Putin's "ghost fleet" to circumvent sanctions. The ship arrives in Romania's EEZ in October 2025, departing from the port of Novorossiysk, enters this waiting "zone" (approx. 34-35 kilometers from the coast, across from Tuzla) on December 5, 2025, and remains for nearly 14 hours at a very stable point, with speeds between 0 and 0.4 knots. Just a few days later, on December 8–9, it returns to virtually the same area and stations again, this time for more than 24 hours. In this last episode, speeds of 0.0 knots also appear, meaning it has effectively stopped. Then, the third episode is shorter—approximately 6 hours with speeds of 0.0–0.2 knots. The repetition is important: one accidental stop can be easily explained; two long stops, in the same perimeter, a few days apart, rather indicate the intentional use of a so-called "waiting area," as can be seen in the image below.
The oil tankers KOLENTE (IMO 9264271) and CLEAN RAIDER (IMO 9425318) were spotted by Marine Traffic at a short distance on December 8, 2025, by Global Fishing Watch. (Source: Global Fishing Watch)
According to the Equasis portal, the KOLENTE oil tanker has been owned since February 6, 2023, by Pulsar Investments Co LLC, registered in Dubai (United Arab Emirates). The ship was built in 2004 and has a tonnage of 25,108 tons, a length of 176 meters, and a width of 31 meters. The tanker has had several names: J. Shartava (in 2004), Cape Bradley (2005), and Pm Bradley (2023). Neither the KOLENTE nor the CLEAN RAIDER are subject to Western sanctions. We also checked the satellite images provided by Copernicus Browser for any indications that the ships CLEAN RAIDER (Uog Despina V) and KOLENTE (Pm Bradley) may have participated in a possible ship-to-ship transfer (STS). Although at the beginning of December 2025 the area under analysis was under a thick layer of clouds, we used the Santinel-1 C-band radar (C-SAR) and active sensor, which allows it to send its own signal to see through clouds and darkness, thus discovering a possible STS on December 4 between the two tankers that correspond exactly to the positions transmitted by AIS by KOLENTE and CLEAN RAIDER. It is possible that the KOLENTE acted as a mother ship, i.e., it took Russian oil from Novorossiysk and then transferred it to Romania's EEZ on the CLEAN RAIDER to be transported abroad, possibly to Panama – the port of Cristobal (according to the destination displayed on Marine Traffic).
A possible ship-to-ship transfer detected by Santinel-1 radar (VH – linear gamma0) between the oil tankers KOLENTE (IMO 9264271) and CLEAN RAIDER (IMO 9425318) on December 4, 2025, in Romania's EEZ. (Source: Copernicus Browser)
Another suspicious case is the presence of the oil tanker in Romania's EEZ KONGUR (formerly Rostov Velikij) with unique identification number IMO 9289001 under the Russian flag. Between December 9 and 10, 2025, the ship enters the same offshore "area" in Romania's EEZ and remains there for over 27 hours, at speeds close to zero. The coordinates are almost identical to those used by KOLENTE and another tanker – PM BACTON (IMO 9264283) the day before. Here we must mention that PM BACTON is not just any ship. In an analysis published by 45north, with regard to the TULU case (IMO 9313462), PM BACTON is involved in STS transfer events, being strongly connected to the port of Novorossiysk—a key hub for Russian oil exports. Thus, its repeated presence in the western Black Sea in December 2025, in the vicinity of Romania's EEZ, takes on broader strategic significance.
According to War and Sanctions, the PM BACTON oil tanker is actively involved in the transport of Russian oil and petroleum products., including through ship-to-ship (STS) transfers and deliberate AIS signal shutdowns, despite the G7 and EU embargo. The vessel frequently operated from the Russian port of Novorossiysk, including from the Sheskaris terminal, connected to Transneft infrastructure, and performed STS including near Romania, with vessels associated with the Russian shadow fleet. On April 11, 2025, Ukraine imposed sanctions on the ship's captain, and PM BACTON is documented as an active element of the Russian Federation's opaque energy export networks. Similarly, we cannot overlook how similar KOLENTE and PM BRADLEY are according to the photos provided by Marine Traffic, being practically the same type of oil tanker.
Furthermore, synchronized track analysis shows that around December 8, 2025, PM BACTON and KONGUR (formerly Rostov Velikij) reach a minimum distance of approximately 6 km from each other, with very close AIS times. This is not proof of ship-to-ship transfer, but it is a clear indicator of operational co-presence in a chosen space, not by chance.
The oil tankers KONGUR (IMO 9289001) and PM BACTON (IMO 9264283) were spotted by Marine Traffic at a distance of approximately 6 km on December 8, 2025, by Global Fishing Watch. (Source: Global Fishing Watch)
In the broader context of the Black Sea, a ship with the name and operational pattern of KONGUR (Rostov Velikij), connecting the east and west of the basin, logically functions as a connecting element between the area of origin of Russian flows and the more permissive offshore areas near the NATO and EU coasts.
The tanker KONGUR (IMO 9289001) docked in the port of Tolyatti (Russia) as shown in photos provided by Marine Traffic in 2019. (Source: Marine Traffic)
The Equasis portal also reveals that the tanker KONGUR (Rostov Velikij) has been owned since August 19, 2024, by Flotpro LLC, a company registered in Moscow. Flotpro LLC specializes in the commercial management of ships, particularly oil tankers, and is associated with the Kremlin's "shadow fleet" used to circumvent Western sanctions. In addition to KONGUR, the Russian company also manages other ships such as VF TANKER 4 (IMO 9640528), SVAROG (IMO 9640566), VELES (IMO 9640516) and PROFESSOR MALYSHKIN (IMO 9645009), and is included on monitoring and sanctions lists, including of Ukraine and OpenSanctions, to support Russian maritime activities and oil exports through illegal structures. KONGUR was built in 2003 and has a tonnage of 4,378 tons, a length of 141 meters, and a width of 16.9 meters. The tanker has had several names: Rostov Velikiy (in 2003), Rostovchanin (2023), and Hors (2025). KONGUR is not currently on the sanctions list, but has been involved in the past, in the Kerch Strait area, in STS transfers with the vessel ZAMBRA (IMO 9175078), which is under sanctions according to the database OpenSanctions.
The present analysis shows that what is happening in Romania's EEZ in the western Black Sea cannot be treated as a mere succession of isolated episodes or as a technical curiosity detected in AIS data. The recurring patterns of stationing, synchronization, and co-presence of oil tankers directly or indirectly connected to Russian energy exports indicate the systematic use of this maritime space as a buffer zone for opaque operations carried out "below the threshold of legality."
Although many of the ships analyzed are not formally on the sanctions lists, their behavior—deliberate stops, near-zero speeds, repeated proximities, and temporal coincidences—suggests established practices to avoid the sanctions regime, including ship-to-ship transfers and deliberate fragmentation of commercial traceability. These practices are not illegal per se, but they exploit the legal ambiguities of the EEZ and the current limitations of control mechanisms, transforming a legitimate navigation space into fertile ground for cumulative risks. The stakes are not purely economic. The normalization of the presence of opaque ships in the vicinity of Romania's critical energy infrastructure, such as the Neptun Deep project, creates latent vulnerabilities in terms of security, the environment, and regional stability. In a maritime basin already marked by military and hybrid confrontations, these offshore routines take on a strategic dimension that goes far beyond oil transportation.
The main conclusion is that the western Black Sea is beginning to function as a testing ground for the limits of Western response.: visible enough to be noticed, but ambiguous enough not to trigger firm responses. That is why integrated monitoring—combining AIS data, satellite imagery, legal analysis, and institutional cooperation—can no longer be an academic exercise or journalistic enthusiasm, but a security necessity that should be coordinated by responsible institutions. Without sustained attention and adaptation of response tools, these practices risk becoming the new normal in the Black Sea, with long-term effects on the credibility of the sanctions regime and the security of the eastern flank of the EU and NATO.
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By Dr. Nicolae Țîbrigan, coordinating expert Digital Forensic Team and Dragoș Tîrnoveanu, founder of the 45north think tank.
