On the morning of September 5, 2025, the pro-Kremlin ecosystem surrounding Gagauzia and Russian-speaking audiences in the Republic of Moldova has relaunched a medical forgery targeting President Maia Sandu: a so-called "certificate" issued by the Döbling clinic in Vienna would attest that the head of state suffers from schizophrenia. The document was clearly a forgery, with a counterfeit signature and linguistic and procedural inconsistencies. The Döbling Clinic has unequivocally denied the existence of any such act since 2024., and the editorial staff of Stopfals.md has published demolition on the same day. Despite the denial, the pro-Kremlin network synchronized a rapid amplification on Gagauznews, a series of Telegram channels, anonymous accounts on Facebook, X, Instagram, VK, YouTube, and TikTok, as well as reposting on two obscure Czech-language websites. Internationally, almost simultaneously, Russia was also involved the Pravda network (Pravda auf Deutsch; Pravda Moldova; World – Pravda EN; Pravda România; Pravda Austria, Bulgaria Pravda) responsible for poisoning artificial intelligence – filling the digital space with false material to manipulate algorithms and linguistic models. Estimate of cumulative audience exceeds 72.4 million views, prior to partial moderation actions on platforms. In fact, the operation resumes almost ad litteram an identical scheme documented in 2024, with the same "executors" and the same visual resources, repackaged for the 2025 electoral calendar.
We recall that in the information ecology of the Republic of Moldova, Gagauznews functions as a central hub for aggregating and redistributing pro-Kremlin propaganda content., an intermediary link between the narrative production hubs in Moscow and the local dissemination channels in Gagauzia, Taraclia, and southern Moldova. The portal is not an independent media initiative, but a politically instrumentalized platform built around a network of actors connected to Ilan Shor's oligarchic group and the new administrative apparatus of Evghenia Guts, the Bashkan of Gagauzia, who was directly promoted by the same circle of influence.
According to data from RISE Moldova, Gagauznews.md (now operating as a clone of Gagauznews.com) is owned by A.O. Anti-Crisis Community Center., registered by Victor Petrov – a local politician who later became vice-chairman of the Executive Committee of Gagauzia. Petrov, known for his anti-Western rhetoric and collaborative relationships with pro-Shor groups, has transformed the Gagauznews infrastructure into an integrated propaganda ecosystem, combining the main website with its Telegram networks, Facebook pages, and TikTok channels, all maintained at minimal cost but with significant amplification capacity.
Collage of screenshots from online posts spreading falsehoods about President Maia Sandu's alleged "schizophrenia," published in multiple languages and on various platforms—from obscure websites to social media—as part of a coordinated pro-Kremlin disinformation campaign
However, all of this low-cost, high-reach propagation architecture works effectively precisely because it is based on modularity and portability: when a domain is blocked, the content is migrated to a clone domain, social media platforms, or satellite sites in the Russian-speaking space, maintaining the continuity of the information flow. Essentially, Gagauznews is not just a publication, but an infrastructure of influence, designed to ensure the narrative resilience of pro-Kremlin networks in the Republic of Moldova and to serve as a buffer platform between local political actors and the Russian Federation's disinformation machine.
Screenshot from the Gagauznews channel promoting false information about Maia Sandu's "schizophrenia," using an official image of the president and forged medical documents from the Döbling clinic—part of the pro-Kremlin disinformation campaign in September 2025
This campaign combines medical misinformation with political sexism, stigmatization of mental health, and tactics to delegitimize pro-European leaders. It simultaneously aims to: erode internal trust in democratic institutions; polarise ideological, linguistic and gender divides; and export Russian narratives about "unstable leaders" promoted by the West. The effects extend to the judicial sphere: in October 2025, in a defamation lawsuit, an attempt was made to formally "reactivate" the narrative by requesting a psychiatric evaluation of the president—a request that was rejected by the court as unfounded.
Analysis of the internationally promoted "Schizophrenia" campaign
Data extracted from digital monitoring platforms confirms that the falsehood about President Maia Sandu's alleged "schizophrenia" was part of a coordinated, transnational, and automated disinformation operation. Between September 1 and 9, 2025, indicators of volume, geographical distribution, and lexical tone show a complex propaganda mechanism, integrated into the infrastructure Pravda Network, known for its global dissemination of pro-Kremlin narratives.
The Campaign reached a peak on September 3, one day after the initial fake was published on Gagauznews, with an increase of over 1800% in mentions. In total, the following were identified 19 online appearances, reflecting not spontaneous viralization, but a concerted mobilization of existing distribution channels. After this explosion, the pace remained steady, a sign of a narrative control strategy designed to maintain public attention without oversaturation.
The graph shows a sharp increase in mentions on September 3, 2025 (10 mentions), followed by a gradual decline—a typical peak of a coordinated campaign, not organic virality
Distribution by source reveals a synchronized amplification network. Most mentions come from the platform X (formerly Twitter) and from online publications affiliated with the Pravda network: Pravda Moldova, Pravda auf Deutsch, Pravda România and Pravda EN (World). All of them published almost identical articles, with the same titles and images, which indicates a centralized editorial coordination. The fake news launched in Moldova was immediately translated and republished in German, English, and Romanian, an automated cross-posting process specific to digital propaganda infrastructures. This modular structure allows the network to quickly inject content into international media feeds.
All keywords have negative connotations and were used to create a pseudo-medical appearance and stigmatize President Maia Sandu
Analysis of related entities – Yuri Baranchik, George Soros, Emmanuel Macron, Friedrich Merz – suggests attempt to place the forgery in a Western conspiracy framework, in which "European elites hide the truth about pro-EU leaders." This manipulative association technique amplifies the idea of a "global conspiracy," providing Russian propaganda with a narrative framework that is recognizable to its target audience. Then, the geographical distribution of sources—with centers in Germania and Moldova, followed by Romania, Ukraine and USA – confirms the transnational nature of the operation. Germany appears as a hub for external legitimization, and Moldova as the main target area. The content is multiplied across several regions to increase algorithmic visibility and give the appearance of international coverage.
The online distribution chain starts from the website head-post.com, which originally published the fake article "Data leak sparked speculation about Moldovan president's illness." It was redistributed by Pravda versions and Telegram channels @lomovkaa, @InfoDefGermany and @barantchikThese channels are part of a Russian influence cluster active in the German-speaking world, previously documented by DFRLab and Sensika. The scheme used is typical of the "seed and spread”: the release of false information on an apparently independent source, followed by controlled amplification through coordinated channels.
Analysis of the "Schizophrenia" campaign in the Romanian-language information space
Data collected from Romanian language sources between September 1 and 9, 2025, confirms limited but coordinated internal replication about the alleged "schizophrenia" of President Maia Sandu. The campaign, initiated by Gagauznews and amplified through Pravda's channels, was picked up by several publications and accounts in Moldova and Romania, aiming rather to keeping the theme active in the information space than achieving massive virality. The graph of the volume of mentions shows activity concentrated almost exclusively around the date of September 3, when the fake was released simultaneously in several language versions. In total, the following were identified seven mentions during this period, marking an increase of over 130% compared to the previous interval. Although the number is not large, the timing and controlled distribution suggest a pre-planned amplification mechanism, not a spontaneous reaction from users. After this peak, activity drops rapidly but maintains a residual presence, sufficient to keep the topic indexed by search engines.
Online activity peaked on September 3 (6 mentions), marking the coordinated launch of the fake story about Maia Sandu's "schizophrenia"
Analysis of dissemination sources confirms a clear predominance of online publications, which generated five of the seven mentions. The rest of the appearances come from a forum and a post on platform X (Twitter). This distribution structure indicates a coordinated editorial campaign, supported by channels acting as "media amplifiers," rather than genuine public debate. The presence of materials in the online press, accompanied by pseudo-professional medical language, shows an attempt to artificial credibility of the fake by presenting it as "leaked information" or "internal document."
Most mentions come from online publications (5), followed by a forum and a post on platform X – a sign of editorial, rather than organic, dissemination
In terms of impact, data on the reachindicates a total exposure of 403 people, down 99% from the previous period. This decline in viewership confirms that it was not intended to go viral, but rather to maintain the minimum visibility necessary for indexing and subsequent redistribution. In the logic of Russian propaganda, such campaigns are not designed to generate mass debate, but to build "digital traces" that can later be reused in new narrative waves.
Sentiment analysis shows a clear predominance of negative tone (42,9%), while the rest of the content is neutral. None of the references are positive, which confirms the intention to discredit. The language used mixes medical terms such as "schizophrenia," "disorder," "depression," "personality," and "panic" with administrative elements such as "confidentiality," "institutions," "correspondence," and "documents." This combination serves to to lend credibility to the narrative, presenting it as a leak of confidential information with political implications. Semantically, the lexicon used betrays a dual intention: stigmatizing mental health and insinuating the president's inability to make important decisions, both recurring themes in pro-Kremlin misogynistic propaganda. Analysis of the dominant entities and keywords confirms this strategy. At the center of the narrative are the terms clinic, president, personality, reason and correspondence, all linked by a narrative framework suggesting an alleged "leak" from a private hospital in Vienna. The inclusion of these terms creates the impression of a fake "medical file" with a verifiable source, although in reality the documents are digitally fabricated. This is a classic mechanism for spreading medical fakes—turning a lie into an apparently credible "lead for investigation."
The central keywords – "schizophrenia," "personality," "cause," "correspondence," "institutions" – highlight the pseudo-medical and stigmatizing language used to legitimize falsehood, and the dominant tone is negative (42.9%) and neutral (57.1%) content with no positive mention
The geographical distribution of mentions indicates a clear concentration in Republic of Moldova (four sources) and a marginal activity in Romania (one). The lack of significant international dissemination suggests that this wave was intended to test the receptivity of the local audience, especially in the context of the Moldovan elections. However, the partial uptake by Romanian sources allows the propaganda to artificially expand the perception of regional media interest, thus strengthening the positioning of the topic in search algorithms.
The “Schizophrenia” disinformation campaign in the Russian-language information ecosystem
Data collected from Russian-language sources between September 1 and 9, 2025, confirms the existence of a coordinated propaganda operations, launched simultaneously to discredit the President of the Republic of Moldova, Maia Sandu, through a false narrative about her alleged "schizophrenia" and hospitalization in a private clinic in Austria. Unlike the modest Romanian-language version, the Russian-language version of this campaign stood out for its exceptional intensity, well-defined media architecture, and an informational impact reaching tens of millions of users, indicating a high level of transnational coordination within the pro-Kremlin network.
The total number of mentions increased dramatically to 430 (+21,400%), peaking on September 3, marking the coordinated launch of the fake news in the Russian-speaking space
The graph of the volume of mentions shows a burst of activity on September 3, when the fake was simultaneously launched on multiple propaganda channels. In just a few hours, over 180 mentions were recorded, out of a total of 430 during the analyzed period — an increase of over 21,000% compared to the previous interval. The peak of activity corresponds exactly to the moment when the original article was published on affiliated portals Pravda Network and KP-Moldova, who provided the "mother narrative" that was subsequently massively redistributed on platform X (formerly Twitter). Subsequently, a gradual decline is observed, characteristic of algorithmic maintenance phase — a strategy whereby content is actively maintained through minor reposts, comments, and automatic redistribution, ensuring continued visibility in search engines.
Platform X dominates dissemination (396 mentions), followed by online media, forums, and YouTube - indicating automated, multi-source distribution
Analysis of the types of sources confirms that platform X served as the main channel for dissemination, generating 396 of the total 430 mentions. The rest of the appearances come from online media (17 mentions), forums (11), YouTube (3), blogs, and isolated comments. This structure indicates a cross-platform injection campaign, in which the message is simultaneously introduced into different media ecosystems to appear organic. Synchronization and repetitiveness are specific features of a semi-automated amplification infrastructure — likely a mix of coordinated accounts, bots, and aggregators integrated into Pravda and MirTesen.
The campaign reached an estimated audience of 72.3 million users, a sign of massive amplification through accounts and websites affiliated with the Pravda network
Data on reach demonstrates the exceptional scale of this campaign. In just a few days, the materials reached a potential audience of over 72 million users, an increase of over 50 million times compared to the previous period. The peak of visibility was recorded between September 3 and 4, confirming the centralized launch of the narrative and its dissemination in successive waves. Beyond the numbers, this phenomenon shows the existence of a redistribution networks with regional coverage, in which websites and accounts from Russia, Bulgaria, Georgia, and Moldova collaborate to create the perception of genuine media interest. In reality, there is a noticeable mirroring the same articles, headlines, and narrative structures, which suggests common editorial control.Total engagement exceeded 1,800 interactions – a modest figure compared to the scale of the reach, but sufficient to influence recommendation algorithms. The peak on September 3 marks the moment when coordinated accounts manually or automatically generated reactions and redistributions intended to "ignite" the narrative and propel it into the feeds of real users. It is a classic tactic of popularity simulation, in which the initial volume of artificial interactions causes platforms to consider the topic "of public interest."
Leading editorial sources confirm that this campaign is part of the Pravda ecosystem. Websites such as Pravda Bulgaria, KP-Moldova, Geworld (Georgia), MirTesen and Argumentî Nedeli published nearly identical articles with standardized headlines and a narrative based on alleged "leaked data" from a Viennese hospital. In all cases, the same text structures are used: references to a "private Austrian clinic," "electroshock therapy," and "acute schizophrenic episodes." This repetitive pattern betrays a centralized content production, with distribution coordinated through pro-Kremlin aggregators.
The graph of feel of keywords reveals the specific language of medical propaganda used to stigmatize political leaders. Key terms — "электросудорожную терапию" (electroconvulsive therapy), "психического расстройства" (mental disorder), "клинической депрессии" (clinical depression), "марионетка" (puppet), "утечке данных" (data leak) — outline a pseudo-medical narrative built on scientific jargon intended to induce plausibility. A distinctive feature of this campaign is the deliberate inclusion of "positive" terms in medical language, such as "course of therapy" or "treatment of schizophrenia," to mask its derogatory nature and enhance its credibility in semantic classification algorithms. In reality, these terms are used ironically, in contexts that associate the idea of treatment with the president's moral and professional incompetence.
Behind this apparent avalanche of information in the Russian-language information space lies a strategic mechanism of reuse of toxic narratives already tested in the past. The campaign on the so-called "schizophrenia of Maia Sandu" is not an isolated initiative, but a revival of an older theme, adapted to the electoral context in the Republic of Moldova and rewritten. to serve the new regional disinformation architecture. By connecting channels in Bulgaria, Georgia, and Moldova, the Pravda network managed to create a coherent information ecosystem, capable of instantly reproducing the same falsehood in multiple linguistic spaces.
The tone is predominantly negative, and pseudo-medical language ("electroconvulsive therapy," "depression," "puppet") is used to discredit the president under the guise of clinical diagnosis
Anatomy of a hybrid operation: FIMI/DISARM tactics, transnational validation, and exploitation of cognitive vulnerabilities
In the logic of the FIMI/DISARM framework, the Russian operation "Maia Sandu's schizophrenia" clearly falls within the spectrum of disinformation tactics systematically used by pro-Kremlin networks. The analysis highlights four main directions:
- Polarization (T0135.004) – exploiting ideological and gender divides to divide the public and fuel mistrust between pro-European and traditionalist segments.
- Defamation (T0140.001) – associating the president with an alleged mental disorder in order to destroy her credibility and reduce her to a media caricature.
- Incitement to hatred (T0140.003) – the normalization of misogyny, the stigmatization of mental health, and exclusionary discourse.
- Reuse of content (T0084) – recycling a fake previously launched in 2024, slightly adapted for the 2025 electoral context.
This set of tactics confirms the systemic nature of the Russian operational module: minimal use of resources for maximum emotional impact, a transnational capillary network, and the ability to pivot quickly between digital platforms to maintain narrative flow.
The transnational dimension of the disinformation operation manifests itself through a mechanism of simulated external validation. The original material, launched on Moldovan channels, was quickly picked up by two marginal Czech-language websites, which add no factual value or expertise, but fulfill a strategic function: creating the illusion of confirmation from another linguistic and cultural space. This is a classic tactic of cross-posting, used to manufacture the appearance of international consensus, which is subsequently reimported into the target space with the argument "look, it's being discussed in Europe too." Thus, the falsehood becomes a "legitimate" narrative through geographical multiplication and apparent diversity of sources, even though all points of propagation are part of the same coordinated information ecosystem.
From a psychological perspective, the campaign relies on several cognitive mechanisms that are well documented in FIMI literature. The authority heuristic is exploited by invoking a real Austrian clinic with an unquestionable medical reputation, which gives the fake an aura of authenticity. The availability heuristic causes a shocking fake, easy to remember and visually recognizable, to dominate conversations and be rapidly redistributed. Misogynistic bias completes this framework, by resorting to persistent stereotypes about women and their supposed emotional instability. When combined with the use of a "medical certificate" image, the operation becomes highly effective in areas where media literacy is low and social polarization is already present, exponentially increasing the risk of information contamination.
The legal ramifications of this case are manifold and outline a gray area between regulation, cybersecurity, and freedom of expression. In addition to the obvious elements of defamation and material forgery in documents—counterfeiting of letterhead, signature, and institutional identity—there is a flagrant violation of the terms of use of digital platforms regarding coordinated inauthentic behavior (CIB), manipulated media and identity harassment.
The operational recommendations formulated following the analysis of this case emphasize the need for an integrated approach, combining strategic response, digital monitoring tools, and cross-border institutional cooperation. First, the official response to such fakes must be strategic, not just tactical: rapid communication must be formulated in a "cold frame," without repeating or legitimizing the falsehood through headlines, and must be accompanied by clear explanations of the mechanism of disinformation, not just its denial. At the same time, persistent mapping of the networks involved is requiredby continuously monitoring nodes in Gagauzia and Russian-language channels on Telegram, with systematic scoring of accounts based on synchronization, content reuse, linguistic and temporal proximity. This methodology allows for the identification of "first-order distributors" and the application of targeted countermeasures—from reporting and public exposure to targeted counter-messages. Last but not least, partnerships between platforms and regulators need to be strengthened, through the escalation of cases of Re-Use of Deceptive Assets and the creation of proactive mechanisms for the automatic detection of manipulative repeat offenders. Coordination with European structures – such as EDMO and DSA teams – is essential to ensure a coherent and synchronized cross-border response capable of reducing the amplification window for fake content and preventing its reuse in future campaigns.
Conclusions
Operation Schizophrenia is a case study of how pro-Kremlin networks, through the Pravda infrastructure, can combine recycled fakes, sophisticated psychological techniques, and transnational amplification mechanisms to undermine pro-European political leaders and erode trust in democratic institutions. Under the guise of a medical leak, the campaign used elements of medical propaganda and political sexism to simultaneously attack Maia Sandu's credibility, the symbolism of female leadership, and Moldova's pro-European narrative.
Far from being a simple attempt at individual discrediting, the case demonstrates the adaptability and persistence of the Russian disinformation ecosystem, which reuses tried and tested themes, images, and formats, recalibrated for new electoral cycles and the cognitive vulnerabilities of the target audience. The coordination between channels in Gagauzia, Pravda networks, and peripheral websites in Central Europe confirms the existence of an integrated narrative infrastructure designed to create the appearance of international media consensus.
Ultimately, the key lesson of this campaign is clear: the fight against disinformation cannot be won through isolated reactions or factual debunking alone, but through an architecture of democratic resilience based on media literacy, institutional cooperation, and rapid digital intervention. Only through a combination of strategic actions—cold communication, automated detection, cross-border partnerships, and protection of the information space—can this type of hybrid aggression be effectively countered, which, under the guise of "medical news," actually attacks the very democratic health of society.
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By Dr. Nicolae Țîbrigan, coordinating expert Digital Forensic Team and Dragoș Sorescu, investigator Digital Forensics Team, in collaboration with A4E Counter Disinformation Network (CDN)
